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Client, Industry and Country Factors Affecting Choice of 
Big N Industry Expert Auditors 
 
This study investigates client choice of industry specialist auditors from among 
the Big N (Big 4 or 5) in an international (non-U.S.) setting. We investigate 
client-specific, industry-level and country-level factors hypothesized to enhance 
or decrease Big N clients’ demand for industry expertise. Using data for 29 
countries and 14 broad industries from 1993-2005, we find that international 
client choice of industry specialist Big N auditors is positively associated with 
client size, client growth opportunities, and client capital intensity. The choice of 
industry specialists from among the Big N is more prevalent in countries where 
levels of investor protection, quality of financial reporting environment, and 
national economic development are higher. Clients belonging to regulated 
industries tend to select industry specialists.  
 
Keywords: Global audit market, industry specialization, audit market shares, 
audit quality, international auditing, Big N auditors  
 
JEL Classifications: G15; L11; M41; M49 
 
Data Availability: The data are available from the Global Vantage database.
Client, Industry and Country Factors Affecting Choice of 
Big N Industry Expert Auditors 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines determinants of clients’ choices of industry expert Big N 
(Big 5 or Big 4) auditors in an international setting. Prior evidence indicates 
that, similar to U. S. clients, international (non-U.S.) clients desiring higher 
quality audits select Big N auditors (Fan & Wong [2005]).1 We employ a 
sample of international clients who have chosen Big N auditors, to investigate 
characteristics of clients that take the additional quality-seeking decision of 
selecting industry specialists from among the Big N.2 Empirical evidence 
suggests that industry specialist auditors have both the incentives and the 
ability to provide higher quality audit services. Simunic and Stein [1987] 
argue that industry-focused audit firms are more likely to invest in 
technologies, physical facilities, personnel, and organization control systems 
that improve the quality of audits in the firms’ focal industries. Recent 
structural shifts by audit firms in the direction of greater industry focus 
suggest that industry specialization plays an increasingly important role in 
audit quality (Hogan & Jeter [1999]; Solomon et al. [1999]).  
Industry-experienced auditors are better able to detect errors among 
clients within their industry specialization than outside their specialization 
(Bedard & Biggs [1991]; Wright & Wright [1997]; Owhoso et al. [2002]). 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, we will refer to audit clients not headquartered in the U.S. as ‘international’ 
clients. 
2 By including in our sample only clients that purchase Big N audits, we avoid confounding 
the choice of a Big N auditor with the choice of an industry specialist auditor. 
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Specialist auditors are more likely to comply with auditing standards than 
non-specialists (O’Keefe et al. [1994]) and are less likely to be associated 
with SEC enforcement actions (Carcello & Nagy [2004]). Research also 
indicates that earnings quality, as measured by earnings response coefficients 
and discretionary accruals, is higher for client firms audited by industry 
specialists than non-specialists (Balsam et al. [2003]; Krishnan [2003]). 
Moreover, financial analysts rank clients of industry-specialist audit firms 
higher, in terms of disclosure quality, than clients of non-specialists (Dunn & 
Mayhew [2004]). Collectively, these findings suggest that an auditor’s 
industry specialization has value to clients, and that capital markets view 
audits provided by industry specialists as having higher quality. Hence, the 
largest audit firms use industry specialization as a differentiation strategy 
(Mayhew & Wilkins [2003]). 
Almost all of the evidence mentioned above is derived from U.S. 
audit engagements. However, the largest audit firms attempt to market their 
audit services globally on the basis of industry specialization. For example, 
PwC’s Global web site provides the following statement: 
 
The depth and breadth of our industry experience, and our 
international perspective, are attributes that our clients value 
highly. We invest significant resources in acquiring, refining and 
sharing these capabilities to further benefit our clients … With 
offices in 769 cities in 144 countries, the member firms of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers offer a complete range of audit and 
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[other] services, tailored to your specific industry, wherever you 
may need them. (http://www.pwc.com/ as of July, 2008) 
  
Existing international evidence on whether industry specialization is a 
dimension of audit quality is mixed, and primarily based on Australian data 
(Ferguson & Stokes [2002]; Ferguson et al. [2003]). 3  Questions exist 
concerning the extent to which the Big N firms are able to provide consistent 
quality of audit services around the world, including industry expertise. The 
SEC [2000, 6] states, “We are concerned that audit firms may not have 
developed and maintained adequate internal quality control systems at a 
global level.”4 Hence, whether clients in countries other than the U.S. (and, 
perhaps, Australia) recognize and seek industry expertise from Big N auditors 
remains an empirical issue. 
We measure an auditor’s industry expertise based on the auditor’s 
industry market share in the client’s (non-U.S.) home country. Recent studies 
by Ferguson et al. [2003], Francis et al. [2005], and Francis et al. [2006] 
investigate the role of audit firms’ individual office (city-level) industry 
expertise. Ferguson et al. [2003] and Francis et al. [2005] document that 
higher audit fees of industry leaders in the Australia and the U.S. audit market 
                                                 
3 De Beelde [1997] uses 1994 data to investigate whether Big N auditors exhibit industry 
specialization. His international (non-U.S.) coverage consists of seven European countries, 
plus Japan. He finds little evidence of industry specialization as he defines it, and does not 
examine determinants of client auditor choice. Fan and Wong [2005] find that firms in eight 
East Asian countries employ Big N auditors when the firms are subject to high agency costs. 
That study does not investigate audit firm industry specialization.   
4 In [2000: fn. 8] the SEC expands on this theme: “See, for example, 34-40945, AAER-1098 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers) and letters from the SEC Chief Accountant to the AICPA SEC 
Practice Section dated November 30 ,1998, and December 9, 1999 regarding the need for 
global quality internal controls over independence matters, available on the SEC website at 
<www.sec.gov>.” Radebaugh and Gray [1997, 651] state: “Because most international public 
accounting firms are mixtures of different national public accounting firms, the quality of 
work performed is bound to vary.” 
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are driven by auditors that are city-specific industry leaders. Francis et al. 
[2006] show that earnings quality is higher when the auditor is a city-specific 
industry leader, but not when an auditor is a national leader without also 
being a city-specific industry leader. We employ national-level measures of 
industry expertise, rather than city-level measures, because the database on 
which we primarily rely, for information about who audits whom, does not 
provide city-level information.5  
This study employs 1993-2005 data from 29 countries, other than the 
U.S., to investigate factors affecting clients’ choice of audits provided by 
industry specialized Big N auditors.6 We employ two sets of explanatory 
variables proxying for international clients’ demand for industry specialist 
audits. The first set consists of variables capturing characteristics of clients 
and their industries that are associated with demand for high quality and/or 
industry specialist audits (Francis & Wilson [1988]; DeFond [1992]; Craswell 
et al. [1995]). These include proxies for client size, financial leverage, growth 
opportunities, capital intensity, reliance on external capital, profitability, 
industry regulation, and industry concentration ratio. Our second set of 
explanatory variables consists of country-specific institutional factors 
representing legal protection of outside investors, quality of financial 
reporting, and national economic development.  
                                                 
5 Most countries in our sample are small enough for audit personnel to travel anywhere 
within those countries, meet with client managers, and return to their offices, in a single day. 
Smaller countries frequently contain only one or two cities in which most publicly-traded 
clients are located. Thus, the distinction between city-level and national-level industry 
expertise is not as important in our study as for studies of larger nations such as the U.S.  
6 Use of dependent variables that capture whether clients of Big N auditors choose industry 
leaders avoids confounding the demand for Big N audits with demand for audits provided by 
industry specialists. It is worthwhile to note that all of our sample companies are audited by 
the Big N. Thus, we investigate whether clients having certain characteristics (e.g., large size) 
choose industry specialists from among the Big N.  
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The results provide substantial support for our hypotheses.7 Of the six 
client-specific explanatory variables, three have significant coefficients, with 
expected signs, across all estimated models in which they appear. 
Specifically, choice of industry specialist auditors by international Big N 
clients is positively associated with client size (LSALE), client growth 
opportunities (market-to-book equity ratio, MB), and client capital intensity 
(CAPINT). One of the two industry-level variables, membership in a 
regulated industry (REGIND), is positively associated with choice of industry 
specialist Big N auditors in nine out of ten models in which it appears. At the 
country level, the choice of industry specialists from among the Big N is 
more prevalent in countries that offer greater legal protection to investors 
(LAW_ENF, VOTING and LEGAL), in countries having better financial 
accounting reporting quality (DISC, FIN_TAX and ACCTG), and in wealthier 
countries with more developed stock markets (LGDP, SMDEV and ECON). 
These results hold even among clients located in the less developed 
economies.8  Weaker evidence suggests that clients having greater financial 
leverage (LEV) tend to purchase industry-specialist Big N audits (significant 
in five out of ten models). The remaining three explanatory variables: 
issuance of equity (ISSUE), client losses (LOSS), and industry concentration 
(HINDEX) either have coefficients that are almost all insignificant, or some 
significant coefficients with signs opposite to expectations. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. This study is 
one of the first to investigate whether industry- and country-level factors 
                                                 
7 The results summarized are those in Table 4. 
8 That is, clients in relatively wealthier countries tend to purchase industry specialist audits, even 
among the set of less-developed economies. 
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systematically affect choice of industry specialist auditors around the world.9 
We find that client-specific factors and country-level factors are more 
important than industry level factors. Second, our study builds on recent 
advances in the finance literature on the role of legal protection for financial 
market development, ownership structure, and private control benefits. We 
document that the level of investor protection appears to affect the demand 
for industry specialist Big N auditors. Third, our study also contributes to a 
growing body of accounting research on the economic effects of differences 
in financial reporting across countries. We provide empirical evidence that 
demand for Big N industry specialist audits is positively related to the quality 
of financial reporting environments world-wide. Fourth, we show that 
national wealth and, to a lesser extent national stock market development, 
have an important effect on auditor choice. Finally, this study investigates 
choice among Big N audit firms in international audit markets. Numerous 
studies have investigated the choice between Big N and non-Big N audit 
firms, mostly using U. S. data, but few studies have investigated client choice 
among the Big N.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  A second section 
develops hypotheses and relates them to explanatory variables.  Section three 
presents our models and dependent variables.  Section four describes the 
sample and reports our primary test results.  A fifth section provides 
additional analyses, and a final section presents a summary and conclusions. 
 
                                                 
9 We note that our use of client-level factors to explain demand for industry expert auditors is 
not unprecedented in the literature (see Godfrey & Hamilton [2005]). Our use of client-level 
factors in an international setting, however, is new. We control for country-level factors 
because of the international nature of our sample clients. 
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2. Hypotheses and Explanatory Variables 
 
In this study, we consider client-specific, industry-level and country-
level factors that enhance or hinder the demand for audits provided by Big N 
accounting firms having expertise in various industries. We assume that an 
audit firm’s industry expertise is costly to develop, but results in higher 
quality audits.10 High quality audits arguably increase the economic value of 
financial accounting information (Bushman & Smith [2001]). The audit 
market is not fully integrated across countries due to the fact that some 
knowledge is not easily transferable, audit techniques require modifications, 
and differences in regulation exist around the globe. However, in spite of 
these barriers, we expect to observe employment of industry specialists in 
settings in which demand for high quality audits is derived from the potential 
benefit of more reliable financial information. We turn now to a detailed 
discussion of factors that should increase or decrease international demand for 
audits by industry specialists. 
 
2.1 Firm-Specific Factors 
Prior international evidence indicates that clients seeking higher 
quality audits choose Big N auditors (Fan & Wong [2005]). Industry 
specialization also can be viewed as a dimension of international audit quality 
(Craswell et al. [1995]). Therefore we expect that international client choice 
of Big N auditors who also are industry specialist auditors, represents demand 
                                                 
10 Industry expertise is costly to develop not only because it requires gathering and analyzing 
industry data, and modifying audit procedures for different industries, but also because a 
‘critical mass’ of clients must be accumulated in a target industry, in the face of competition 
from other audit firms. This could lead to heavy discounting of initial audit fees. 
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for audit quality higher than that provided by Big N auditors who are not 
industry specialists. We expect the same variables that explain choice of a Big 
N versus non-Big N auditor also will explain choice of an industry specialist 
auditor from among the Big N. DeFond [1992] and Francis and Wilson [1988] 
demonstrate that the demand for quality-differentiated (Big Six) audits is an 
increasing function of proxies for firms’ agency costs. Agency costs are 
problematic when information asymmetry exists between principals and 
agents, and when opportunities exist for agents to transfer corporate wealth to 
themselves. Client-specific demand for high quality audits should be 
positively associated with proxies for those conditions: opportunity to transfer 
wealth via accruals (capital intensity), proxies for information asymmetry 
(growth opportunities), and opportunities for managers to expropriate capital 
provided by owners and lenders (client size, financial leverage, need for 
external capital). We employ client profitability (loss or no loss) as a control 
variable, without specifying an expected sign.11 See Godfrey and Hamilton 
[2005] and Francis et al. [1999] for additional discussion of these explanatory 
variables.12 These two studies examine the demand for auditor specialization 
in the U.S. and Australia. We complement these studies by assessing whether 
the demand for auditor industry specialization applies around the world. Our 
first hypothesis, stated in alternate form, is: 
                                                 
11  The expected coefficient sign for LOSS is unclear. Clients having poor financial 
performance arguably are less likely to seek (or be accepted by) large, high quality auditors. 
However, Choi and Wong [2007] find a positive association between LOSS and choice of 
high quality auditor.  
12 We do not include a variable that captures the operating cycle as the inclusion of that 
variable reduces our sample by 50%. 
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H1: Choice of an industry specialist among Big N auditors is positively 
associated with client size, financial leverage, growth, capital intensity, 
and the need for external financing. 
Client size (LSALEj) is measured by log of sales. Financial leverage 
(LEVj) is measured by a long-term debt to assets ratio. We use MBj (the 
market-to-book equity ratio) to proxy for growth opportunities. CAPINTj is 
the capital intensity measured by gross property plant and equipment divided 
by sales. The need for external capital (ISSUEj) is an indicator variable that 
equals ‘one’ if the change in external equity is greater than 15% and ‘zero’ 
otherwise. LOSSj is a control variable that equals ‘one’ if net income is 
negative and ‘zero’ otherwise.  
 
2.2 Industry-Level Factors 
2.2.1 Industry Concentration  
Firms in industries characterized by small numbers of powerful, 
differentiated producers (i.e. firms in concentrated industries) desire auditors 
who do not also audit their competitors (Kwon [1996]). As the degree of 
concentration in an industry increases, surviving clients will be reluctant to 
use the same auditors, because they do not want to risk the transfer of 
proprietary information to their competitors. In addition, the benefits to 
investors of financial accounting information arguably are less in highly 
concentrated industries (Bushman & Smith [2001]). Thus industry specialist 
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auditors are less likely to be employed in concentrated industries. 13  Our 
second hypothesis, in alternate form, is: 
H2: Choice of an industry specialist among Big N auditors is negatively 
associated with a proxy for industry concentration. 
The proxy for industry concentration is the Herfindahl index (HINDEXk), 
which is defined as ∑ =nj js1 2 where s j is market share of firm j based on sales 
in industry k.14 Larger values correspond to more concentrated industries.  
 
2.2.2 Regulated Industries  
Banks, insurance companies, and several other businesses are subject to 
incremental regulation in most countries. Industry regulation requires audit 
firms to be familiar with the specialized reporting rules and filing 
requirements set by government or private sector regulatory bodies. For 
example in the U.S., the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) publishes individual industry audit guidelines for oil and gas 
companies, airlines, security dealers, finance companies, and other regulated 
industries. Those international audit firms that invest in acquisition of 
regulated industry expertise are likely to be viewed as providers of higher 
                                                 
13 It is worth noting that audit firms arguably have less incentive to develop industry expertise 
in highly concentrated industries since, by definition, such industries tend to contain only a 
few large clients. If Big N firms tend to have fairly equal shares among clients in a 
concentrated industry, then designation of one firm as the industry leader creates a distinction 
without a difference. Supply-side considerations therefore suggest that there might be no 
association between industry concentration and employment of an industry specialist auditor. 
14 Subscript “k” denotes industry membership which is determined by the SIC code following 
the classification schemes used by Frankel et al. (2002): agriculture (0100–0999), mining & 
construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles & 
printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals 
(2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 1300–1399), financial institutions (6000–6999), durable 
manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–
4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services (7000–8999, excluding 7370–7379), 
computers (3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379).  
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quality audits, for clients in those regulated industries.15 In essence, client 
choice of an industry specialist auditor conveys a message of greater 
information quality in regulated industries. Our third hypothesis, in alternate 
form, is: 
H3: Choice of an industry specialist among Big N auditors is positively 
associated with membership in a regulated industry. 
Similar to Francis et al. [1999], and following Eichenseher and Danos 
[1981], we define variable REGINDk to represent regulated industries. 
REGINDk is coded ‘one’ if the industry is railroad (SICs 4011 and 4100), 
trucking (4210 and 4213), airlines (4512, 4513, 4522, and 4581), telephone 
communications (4812 and 4813), electric companies (4911), gas companies 
(4922, 4923, 4924), personal credit (6141), and insurance (6311), and ‘zero’ 
otherwise.  
 
2.3 Country-Level Factors  
 Our expectations, regarding the effects of country-level factors on 
demand for industry specialist audits, are based on the idea that the value of 
audits is derived from the value of high quality financial information. In turn, 
high quality information is more valuable in nations that protect investor 
wealth, in nations that are more economically developed, and in which 
national regulators are committed to facilitating or requiring high quality 
financial information. 
                                                 
15 The existence of special reporting rules, filing guidelines, and audit standards arguably 
serve as a barrier to entry for audit firms desiring to serve regulated clients. The largest 
international audit firms are likely to have the resources needed to hurdle this barrier to entry. 
It is also possible that leading national (rather than international) audit firms will acquire 
knowledge of the industry-specific regulations that are particular to their home countries. 
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2.3.1 Protection of Outside Investors 
Research in finance suggests that protection of outside investors is a 
key determinant of financial market development, capital and ownership 
structures, dividend policies, and firms’ equity valuations (e.g., La Porta et al. 
[1997, 1998, 2000]). Bushman and Smith [2001] argue that the benefits of 
financial accounting information are greater in countries that protect investors 
against expropriation of wealth by governments. We assert that the benefits 
of higher quality audits (by Big N industry specialists) likewise are greater in 
such countries. Using categories of investor protection drawn from La Porta 
et al. ([1997, 2000]), we investigate whether such protection has a systematic 
influence on client auditor choice among the Big N. Our fourth hypothesis, in 
alternate form, is: 
H4: Choice of an industry specialist among Big N auditors is positively 
associated with proxies for national levels of legal protection for 
investors.  
We employ three proxies for investor protection. The first proxy is a 
law enforcement index (LAW_ENFl) which is the mean score of three legal 
enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. [1998], and used in Leuz et 
al. [2003].16 The law enforcement index values range from zero to ten, with 
higher scores for greater law enforcement. The second proxy for shareholder 
legal protection is a measure of shareholder voting rights. ‘Antidirector 
rights’, reported in La Porta et al. [1998], indicates how easy it is for 
                                                 
16Subscript “l” denotes country “l”. The three variables are (1) the mean for 1980-1983 of a 
variable provided by Business International Corp., capturing the efficiency and integrity of 
the judicial system; (2) the mean for 1982-1995 of a rule of law variable obtained from 
International Country Risk; and (3) the mean for 1982-1995 of a corruption variable that 
assesses the corruption in government, obtained from International Country Risk.  
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shareholders to exercise their voting rights.17 This index ranges from zero to 
five, with higher scores indicating greater protection of shareholders. For 
convenience, we name this variable VOTINGl. The third proxy, LEGALl, is 
the principal component for the two legal variables, derived from a factor 
analysis. We expect all three variables to be positively associated with choice 
of Big N industry specialist auditors. 
 
2.3.2 Financial Reporting Environment 
National financial reporting environment is an important institutional 
factor that affects a company’s accounting information quality. Previous 
studies suggest that higher reporting quality, through expanded disclosure, is 
associated with greater market liquidity and lower cost of equity capital (see 
Healy & Palepu [2001], for a detailed review). In an international setting, 
Young and Guenther [2003] show that countries whose financial accounting 
environments lead to greater disclosure of value-relevant accounting, are 
associated with higher international capital mobility. Hence, we expect a 
greater demand for high-quality (industry-specialized) Big N auditors in a 
strong financial reporting environment, to assure outside investors of the 
quality and credibility of accounting information in decision making (Fan & 
Wong [2005]). Our fifth hypothesis, stated in alternate form, is: 
                                                 
17 The index aggregates the following components of shareholder rights: (1) the ability to vote 
by mail; (2) the ability to gain control of shares during the shareholders’ meeting; (3) the 
possibility of cumulative voting for directors; (4) the ease of calling an extraordinary 
shareholders meeting; and (5) the availability of a mechanism allowing minority shareholders 
to make legal claims against the directors. 
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H5: Choice of an industry specialist among Big N auditors is positively 
associated with proxies for quality of national financial reporting 
environment. 
We use three proxies to measure the extent of accounting information 
provided in each country. The first proxy is the disclosure index (DISCl) 
developed by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research 
(CIFAR [1995]), and used by Saudagaran and Diga [1997] among others. CIFAR 
creates a country-specific index by rating the annual reports of at least three firms 
in every country for inclusion or omission of 90 specific items.18 Each country is 
given a score ranging from zero to 90, with higher scores indicating more 
disclosure. The second proxy for financial reporting environment is the extent of 
financial and tax accounting conformity reported by Hung [2000]. 19  In some 
countries, financial reports effectively reflect tax laws, which in turn are 
influenced by political, economic, and social objectives. Because the primary 
objective of tax rules is not to satisfy the information needs of capital market 
participants, the value relevance of financial reports in countries with high tax-
book conformity is reduced (Ali & Hwang [2000]). The value of financial 
information (and the derived value of higher quality audits) potentially is greater 
when there is weak link between tax and financial accounting rules. Using Hung’s 
ratings, we create variable FIN_TAXl to capture the extent of tax and financial 
accounting alignment (tax-to-book). FIN_TAXl is an indicator variable that equals 
                                                 
18 The 90 items include specific disclosures in the following seven categories: general information 
(8 items), income statement (11 items), balance sheet (14 items), funds flow statement (5 items), 
accounting policy disclosure (20 items), shareholders’ information (20 items), and other 
supplementary information (12 items). 
19 Hung [2000] classifies a country’s alignment between financial and tax accounting rules based 
on the following criteria: existence of deferred taxes, dominance of legal form over substance, 
allowance of additional accelerated depreciation, and dependency of amortization on tax laws. 
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‘one’ if tax accounting and financial accounting methods diverge, and ‘zero’ if 
they are similar.20 The last proxy, ACCTGl, is the principal component for the 
financial reporting variables, derived from a factor analysis. If higher quality 
audits are more valuable in nations requiring better disclosure and financial 
reporting, we expect all three variables to be positively associated with choice of 
Big N industry specialist auditors.  
 
2.3.3 National Economic Development 
Claessens and Laeven [2003] and Doidge et al. [2007] posit that a 
high level of national economic development is associated with higher quality 
institutions that facilitate private contracting. This in turn should increase 
demand for reputable information intermediaries such as high-quality, 
industry-specialist auditors, to assure and certify information that is used in 
the contracting. Our sixth hypothesis, stated in alternate form, is: 
H6: Choice of an industry specialist among Big N auditors is positively 
associated with proxies for national economic development. 
We employ three metrics that reflect national economic development. The 
first is the level of annual GDP per capita in each country. We expect greater 
economic wealth to have a positive impact on auditor choice because many 
companies in less wealthy countries may not be able to afford hiring high 
quality auditors (Choi & Wong [2007]). Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDP), based on 2000 constant prices, is collected from the World Bank’s 
                                                 
20 The various country-level variables (LAW_ENF, VOTING, DISC, and FIN_TAX) each are 
measured at a specific point in time (in the 1980s or 1990s) rather than being measured each 
year. We assume that countries’ institutional environments remain stable over lengthy periods 
of time. To the extent this assumption is incorrect, it should bias against finding significant 
coefficients for these variables. 
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World Development Indicators database. We log-transform the GDP data 
(denoted by LGDP) since GDP is highly skewed. Our second proxy for 
national economic development is the extent of development of national stock 
markets. Ali & Hwang [2000] argue that investors in market-oriented 
financial systems (where equity financing is more prevalent) demand more 
information than those in bank-oriented financial systems (where debt 
financing is more important). They also should demand higher quality 
information. Fan & Wong [2005] provide evidence that firms employ high-
quality auditors when seeking external capital in the stock markets. The strong 
information oversight provided by a high quality auditor is likely to reduce 
information asymmetry between a company’s managers and investors, thus 
lowering the cost of capital. Hence, we expect demand for industry specialist 
Big N auditors to be greater where equity markets are more developed. Stock 
market development (SMDEV) is measured by stock market capitalization 
divided by gross (not per capita) GDP. The data for SMDEV are obtained from 
Beck et al. [2000]. The final proxy is ECONl, which is the principal 
component for the national economic development variables, derived from a 
factor analysis. We expect all three variables to be positively associated with 
choice of Big N industry specialist auditors. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1 Measure of Auditor Industry Expertise  
Auditor industry expertise is typically measured by an auditor’s 
industry market share (e.g., Danos & Eichenseher [1982]; Balsam et al. 
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[2003]; Krishnan [2003]).21 We calculate a Big N auditor’s market share in a 
given industry, and year, as follows: 
∑∑
∑
= =
==
k ik
ik
I
i
J
j
ijk
J
j
ijk
ik
SALES
SALES
MSADTR
1 1
1_                                                        (1) 
We suppress the subscript denoting a specific year. SALES denotes client sales 
revenue. The numerator is the sum of the sales of all Jik clients of audit firm i 
in industry k, where the industry is as defined in Frankel et al. [2002]. The 
denominator in equation (1) is the sales of all Jik clients in industry k, summed 
over all Ik audit firms providing audits to that industry.22  
Our measure of auditor i’s industry k expertise is based upon that 
auditor’s market share among clients in industry k that are headquartered in 
each individual country. The assumption is that audit firm i is more likely to 
be perceived as offering expertise in industry k and country l if audit firm i has 
a high market share in industry k within country l. Our dependent variable, 
SPECjk, is defined as ‘one’ if client j, headquartered in nation l, purchases 
audits from the auditor having a ‘large’ value of ADTR_MS in industry k in 
nation l. SPECjk is defined as ‘zero’ otherwise. We consider an auditor to have 
a large market share in the home industry k, if its value of ADTR_MS for k is 
                                                 
21 Conceptually, industry market share would be measured as audit fees earned by an auditor 
in an industry, as a proportion of the total audit fees earned by all auditors that serve that 
particular industry. Based on data availability, prior studies (such as Krishnan [2003]) use 
client sales rather than auditor fees to compute proxies for auditor market shares in industries. 
Following these studies, we use client sales to estimate industry market shares, since data 
about audit fees are either costly to collect or not available in many of the sample countries 
under investigation. 
22 All Ik audit firms include both Big N and other audit firms. 
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at least 20% prior to 1998, 24% for the 1998-2001 period, and 30% for the 
2002-2005 period.23  
 
3.2 Model Specification  
We estimate the following logistic regression model of auditor choice 
using client-specific, industry-level, and country-level explanatory variables:  
SPEC = αο + β1LSALEj + β2LEVj + β3MBj + β4CAPINTj + β5ISSUEj  
                   + β6LOSSj + β7HINDEXk + β8REGINDk + β9COUNTRYl + ejk   (2) 
where  
SPEC = a dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ if client j purchases 
audits from the auditor having at least 20%/24%/30% 
market share (for the period prior to 1998, 1998-2001, 
and after 2001 respectively) in industry k in the national 
market, and ‘zero’ otherwise; 
LSALEj = the log of client j’s sales; 
LEVj = the long-term debt-to-asset ratio of client j; 
MBj = client j’s market-to-book equity ratio; 
CAPINTj = client j’s capital intensity measured by gross property, 
plant & equipment divided by sales; 
ISSUEj = a dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ if client j’s book 
value of equity increases by more than 15% from the 
prior year; ‘zero’ otherwise; 
                                                 
23 Following Neal & Riley [2004], we employ a cut off for ‘large’ market shares of (1/N)*1.2, 
where N is the number of big international audit firms. The largest firms are the Big 6, during 
the period 1993-1997, the Big 5 after the merger between Coopers and Lybrand and Price 
Waterhouse in 1998, and Big 4 after the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002.  
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LOSSj = a dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ if client j’s net 
income is negative; ‘zero’ otherwise; 
HINDEXk = Herfindahl concentration ratio of client j’s industry k; 
REGINDk = a dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ if client j’s industry 
k is regulated; ‘zero’ otherwise. See the text for 
specification of regulated industries; 
COUNTRYl = Country-level variables: LAW_ENFl, VOTINGl, LEGALl, 
DISCl, FIN_TAXl, ACCTGl, LGDPl , SMDEVl and 
ECON; 
   
COUNTRY-level variables include: 
LAW_ENFl = a law enforcement index for country l (see definition in 
text); higher scores indicate better law enforcement; 
VOTINGl = an investor voting rights index for country l (see 
definition in text); higher scores indicate better voting 
rights; 
LEGALl = principal component extracted from LAW_ENF and VOTING; 
DISCl = an information disclosure index for country l (see 
definition in text); higher scores indicate more extensive 
disclosure; 
FIN_TAXl = a dichotomous variable coded ‘one’ if country l’s tax 
accounting and financial reporting methods diverge 
substantially (Hung [2000]); ‘zero’ otherwise; 
ACCTGl = principal component extracted from DISC and FIN_TAX; 
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LGDPl = natural logarithm of GDP per capita for country l; 
SMDEVl = stock market capitalization divided by gross GDP for 
country l; 
ECONl = principal component extracted from LGDP and SMDEV. 
   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample  
Data for the sample period 1993-2005 are obtained from the Global 
Vantage database. Our sample countries are determined as follows. First, we 
begin with the 49 countries (with the necessary institutional data) that are 
listed in La Porta et al. [1998]. To meaningfully compute and compare 
auditors’ market shares, and clients’ industry concentration ratios across 
industries and countries, we require at least 10 observations in each industry, 
for a particular year, to be included in the sample. A total of 35 countries meet 
the criterion (that is, have one or more industries containing 10 companies). 
We remove Japan, Korea, and Pakistan from the sample, because the identity 
of the auditors is not indicated in the database for these countries.24 We next 
remove three countries (Ireland, New Zealand, and Turkey) since most of the 
data for control variables are not available for these countries in the Global 
Vantage database. Our final sample consists of the following 29 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, 
                                                 
24 More than 95% of the auditor names are designated as ‘others’ in Global Vantage for these 
three countries. For example, the local name for KPMG in Japan is Kainan Audit Corporation, 
and it is recorded by Global Vantage as ‘other’. Hence, we are not able to obtain the identity 
of the auditors in these countries. 
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Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. 
We employ 14 broadly-defined industries based on Frankel et al. 
[2002]’s classification, providing a total of 39,053 firm-years, usable for the 
study.25 Panels A, B, and C of Table 1 report the distribution of observations 
by country, year, and industry, respectively. In Panel A, there is significant 
variation in the number of firm-year observations across countries due to 
differences in capital market development, country size, and the availability 
of complete financial accounting data. Except for the United Kingdom, no 
country contributes as much as eleven percent of the total firm-years. In the 
subsequent sensitivity analysis, we find that our results are robust after 
excluding clients in the United Kingdom, and after excluding clients located 
in developed countries in general. The percent of companies audited by Big N 
firms exceeds fifty percent for a majority of the sample countries. Countries 
included in our tests are all drawn from Big N clients. 
In Panel B, the number of firm-years grows over time because of the 
increasing coverage of international companies in the Global Vantage 
database. The decrease in firm-years for 2005 reflects incomplete database 
coverage of that year. Panel C reports the distribution of observations by 
industry. The largest number of firm-years is found among durable 
manufacturers.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
                                                 
25 We winsorize each of the continuous control variables (LEV, CAPINT, LSALE, MB) used in the 
regression at the top and bottom one percent to remove extreme values. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 Table 2, Panel A, shows the means of the dependent variable, SPEC, 
the means for client-specific variables (SALE, LEV, MB, CAPINT, ISSUE, 
LOSS), and means for industry-level variables (HINDEX and REGIND), by 
country. Table 2, Panel B presents the country-level explanatory variables. 26 
The values for VOTING, LAW_ENF, and DISC are constant over time for an 
individual country, e.g., the value for LAW_ENF for Australia is 9.51 for each 
year. The values for SMDEV and GDP are mean values, computed over 1993-
2005. We note that the amounts of our country-level explanatory variables 
differ substantially across countries having highly developed economies. 
Consider, for example, investors’ voting rights (VOTING). The level of this 
variable is highest in the U.K. and its former colonies such as Australia and 
Canada. It is substantially lower in some countries in continental Europe: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Germany. Yet all the countries named have 
developed economies. The same is true to some extent for the other country-
level variables. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.3 Variable Correlations 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations for the dependent and 
explanatory variables. We apply a log transformation to country GDP 
(denoted as LGDP) due to the highly skewed distribution of the variable. 
Consistent with our expectation, SPEC is positively and significantly 
                                                 
26  Eleven countries have a low conformity of accounting and tax reporting, while eight 
countries have high conformity of accounting and tax rules. Ten countries are not coded as 
these countries are not included in Hung [2000]’s sample and hence not reported in Hung’s 
study. 
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correlated with most of the explanatory variables (LSALE, LEV, CAPINT, 
REGIND, LAW_ENF, VOTING, LEGAL, FIN_TAX, ACCTG, LGDP). 
However, inconsistent with our expectation, SPEC is positively associated 
with HINDEX, and negatively associated with SMDEV and ECON. We 
emphasize that these are univariate correlations, and we rely on the regression 
analyses to draw inferences. The correlations among the country level 
variables are high, so we employ them in two ways. First, we estimate models 
in which we enter only one country-level variable at a time (or one country-
level principal component factor) into our regressions. Second, we estimate 
one model in which all principal components extracted from the legal, 
financial reporting and national economic development variables are entered 
simultaneously. 27  The former regressions allow us to determine which 
country-level variables (including principal component factors) are 
individually significant, and whether any client-level or industry-level 
variables are sensitive to inclusion of specific country-level variables. The 
latter regression indicates which of the country-level principal component 
factors have explanatory power when all are included.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.4 Regression Results 
The (logistic) regression model results of estimating equation (2) are 
presented in Table 4. The model is estimated using a maximum of 39,053 
firm-year observations. In five results columns the number of observations is 
                                                 
27 This procedure reduces a potential multi-collinearity problem. Factor analysis indicates that 
LAW_ENF and VOTING are measuring one construct. The same is true for LGDP and 
SMDEV, and for FIN_TAX and DISC. Hence, we use the principal components, LEGAL, 
ACCTG, and ECON, derived from the factor analysis, in the combined model.  
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less due to missing data for variables DISC and FIN_TAX. The regressions in 
Table 4 employ multiple observations per client over time. Such observations 
are unlikely to be fully independent, and thus regression residuals may be 
serially or cross-sectionally correlated. Hence, we run logistic regressions 
with clustered robust errors to account for both serial and cross-sectional 
correlations (Rogers [1993]; Williams [2000]; Petersen [2006]). Following 
Choi & Wong [2007], for all tests reported below, the Wald-statistics are 
based on clustered standard errors (clustered by country and year).28 
 The dependent variable captures whether or not the Big N auditor 
chosen is an industry specialist. The first nine regression models include only 
one country-level variable each, while the last regression model includes all 
principal components derived from the factor analysis (LEGAL, ACCTG, and 
ECON). Consistent with our expectation, SPEC is positively and significantly 
associated with LSALE, MB, and CAPINT at the 1% level, providing support 
for hypothesis H1 (i.e. three out of five proxies are significant with expected 
signs). LEV is positively associated with SPEC in five models while ISSUE is 
either not associated with SPEC, or is associated with a coefficient sign 
opposite to expectation. LOSS is positively associated with SPEC in several 
models. Among the industry-level variables, SPEC is consistently and 
positively associated with REGIND, in agreement with H3. However, 
inconsistent with H2, we do not find a significant and consistent association 
between HINDEX and SPEC. This finding agrees with a recent study by the 
General Accounting Office [2003]. The GAO reports that when large public 
companies were asked whether they would choose an accounting firm as their 
                                                 
28 We also run the regression clustered by country, industry, and year. The results are similar. 
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auditor when that firm also audits one of their competitors, 92% of the 
respondents said ‘yes’.29 
Table 4 also explores the explanatory power of the country-level 
variables. Because of the substantial correlations between some country-level 
variables, we present some models that include only one of the country-level 
variables in each regression. This enables us to determine whether the 
significance levels of individual client-level and industry-level variables are 
contingent on the inclusion of particular country-level variables. Consider 
first the proxies employed to test H4: LAW_ENF, VOTING, and LEGAL. In 
models 1-3, the coefficients of of these variables are positive as expected and 
highly significant. Together, the coefficient results offer strong support for 
H4: choice of an industry specialist auditor is positively associated with 
proxies for national levels of legal protection. The significance of other 
variables is unaffected by which of these country-level variables is included 
in the model. 
Next consider the results for variables used to test H5: DISC, 
FIN_TAX, and ACCTG. In models 4-6, the coefficients for these variables are 
positive as expected and highly significant. Together, the coefficient results 
offer strong support for H5: choice of an industry specialist auditor is 
positively associated with proxies for national quality of financial reporting 
and disclosures. Inclusion of DISC has no effect on the significance of other 
variables in the model. However, inclusion of either FIN_TAX or ACCTG has 
                                                 
29 Another possible explanation is that the Herfindahl index is a poor proxy for industry 
concentration. We compute it using Global Vantage database, so only publicly traded 
companies’ data are employed in constructing this index. Ideally the index should be 
computed using data for both public and private firms (Ali et al. [2008]). We do not employ 
private companies’ data because it is unavailable for most clients in an international setting.  
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the effect of reducing the explanatory power of REGIND, and increasing the 
explanatory power of ISSUE and LOSS.  Finally, consider the results for 
variables used to test H6: LGDP, SMDEV and ECON. In models 7-9, the 
coefficients for these variables are positive and significant, offering support 
for H6. Inclusion of each of these variables does not affect the significance of 
other variables in the models. Choice of an industry specialist auditor is 
positively associated with proxies for national economic development.  
We include all three country-level variables extracted from the factor 
analysis in model 10. The coefficients of ACCTG and ECON are positive and 
highly significant, while the coefficient of LEGAL is positive and marginally 
significant. Our results suggest that legal environment, financial reporting 
quality and national economic development have incremental power in 
explaining choice of industry specialists among Big N auditors. Overall, our 
results in Table 4 support the importance of several client-specific factors in 
the decision to choose Big N industry-specialist auditors: size, growth 
prospects, and capital intensity. The results also indicate the importance of 
client membership in a regulated industry, but not of industry concentration.30 
Finally, the results suggest that three country-level institutional factors affect 
choice of industry specialists from among Big N auditors. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.5 Additional Analyses 
4.5.1 Alternative Dependent Variable  
                                                 
30 We note that a client-level factor, capital intensity, is significant. High capital intensity 
serves as a barrier to entry, and capital intensity varies across industries. Thus it is likely that 
the capital intensity variable pre-empts some of the explanatory power of industry 
concentration. 
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 We perform several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our 
results. First, as an alternative to dependent variable SPEC, we define SPEC1jk 
as equal to ‘one’ if client j, headquartered in nation l, purchases audits from 
the auditor having the largest value of ADTR_MS in industry k in nation l. 
SPEC1jk is defined as ‘zero’ otherwise. In essence, this dependent variable 
defines only one auditor per industry-country pair as an industry specialist. 
 Results for the alternative dependent variable SPEC1 are reported in 
Table 5. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 4, with the 
following major exceptions. First, HINDEX is positively and significantly 
associated with SPEC1, while in our main analysis of Table 4 we do not find 
any association between HINDEX and SPEC. Second, the coefficients of 
REGIND are less significant than in Table 4. Although the Table 4 and Table 
5 results are largely in agreement, in those respects where they differ we 
prefer to rely on Table 4. SPEC1 arguably is overly restrictive in limiting 
industry-specialist status to a single Big N firm per industry-country pair. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.5.2 Stability of Audit Specialists over Time 
A maintained hypothesis of this study is that identities of Big N 
industry specialists are fairly stable over the entire sample period. 31  We 
attempt to measure the stability of audit specialists over three sub-periods: 
before 1998 (Big N = Big 6), between 1998 and 2001 (Big N = Big 5), and 
2002-2005 (Big N = Big 4). We compute a stability metric for each industry-
country pair over each sub-period. For example, consider the 2002-2005 sub-
                                                 
31 If this assumption is not valid it should bias against the significance of our explanatory variables. 
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period during which Big N = Big 4. Suppose for a particular country (say 
Singapore), and a particular industry (say Computers), the market leader for 
the entire four years is KPMG. Then the stability metric is “1.” If KPMG is 
the market leader for three of the four years, then the stability metric is ‘0.75.’ 
Hence the stability statistic captures the proportion of years that the same 
auditor is the market leader in the industry over a specific period. The larger 
the statistic is, the greater the stability of audit specialists over time. The mean 
statistic for all countries and all industries for the period 2002-2005 is 0.87. 
This number is quite high, indicating stable audit specialists over the years 
2002-2005. We repeat the analyses for the period 1998-2001 and for 1993-
1998. The mean statistics are 0.87 and 0.90 respectively. 32  Overall, the 
stability statistic is high, and does not vary much across sub-periods, 
suggesting that the identities of audit specialists are stable over the entire 
sample period 1993-2005. 
 
4.5.3 Removing Firms cross-listed in the U.S. Market 
 We remove 2,119 firm-years relating to those firms that cross-list 
their shares in the U.S. market, since the firms’ auditor choice may be related 
to their overseas equity issues (Fan & Wong [2005]). The results, as reported 
in Table 6, provide similar results as those in Table 4 except for the following 
major differences. First, the coefficients of REGIND are not significant in 
models 5, 6 and 10. Second, the coefficient of SMDEV is not significant in 
                                                 
32 We compute metrics for three sub-periods (rather than for the entire sample period) because the 
identities of Big N industry specialists are non-comparable across periods due to Big N mergers. 
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model 8. Third, the coefficients of HINDEX are negative and significant in 
models 5, 6, 7 and 10. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.5.4 Alternative proxies for financial reporting  
To supplement results for variables DISC and FIN_TAX, we use two 
alternative measures to capture the quality and quantity of accounting 
disclosure: (1) the disclosure index constructed by Young and Guenther 
[2003]; and (2) the accrual index constructed by Hung [2000]. Our 
(untabulated) results indicate that the disclosure index and accrual index are 
positively and significantly associated with SPEC at the 1% level. We also 
construct a principal component based on these two alternative proxies for 
financial reporting quality. Our untabulated results indicate that, along with 
LEGAL and ECON, this alternative principal component is positively and 
significantly associated with SPEC at the 1% level. 
 
4.5.5 Legal Origins 
 A concurrent study (Francis & Wang [2008]) suggests that demand 
for Big N auditors is dependent on a country’s legal origin. We therefore test 
whether legal origin (COMMON, coded ‘one’ if the country has a common 
law origin, and ‘zero’ if the country has a code law origin) also is associated 
with industry specialist auditor choice. The (untabulated) results indicate that 
COMMON is positively and significantly associated with SPEC (Wald 
statistic 5.98, p=0.01). This finding suggests that legal origin (similar to 
LAW_ENF and VOTING) captures the legal environment in each country and 
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is positively associated with demand for industry specialist auditors. We also 
estimate a model that includes COMMON, along with ACCTG and ECON. 
Our untabulated results indicate that ACCTG and ECON continue to be 
significant at the 1% level, but COMMON is not statistically significant.33 
 
4.5.6 Clients’ Demand for Audit Specialists in Less Developed Countries 
 In our main analysis, we show that demand for audit specialists is 
systematically associated with client and industry characteristics. Some of 
these results have been documented previously in developed economies (e.g., 
Australia) and it is worthwhile to explore whether such relations still hold in 
developing economies. We address this issue in two ways to ensure that our 
findings are not being driven by the large number of observations provided by 
the developed economies. First, given that firms in the United Kingdom 
constitute 25% of the total sample, we examine whether the exclusion of these 
firms affects the main results. The results are similar to those reported in 
Table 4 except for the following. First, the coefficients of LEV are positive 
and significant for only three (out of ten) models. Second, DISC and SMDEV 
are not significant in models that contain each of them as the only country-
level variable. Third, the coefficient of LEGAL is no longer significant when 
ACCTG and ECON are also added to the model.  
Second, we document results after deleting all developed countries 
from the sample. To identify developed and developing countries, we use the 
                                                 
33 One possible explanation for this non-result might be that COMMON does not capture the 
variation in legal enforcement that exists even within the common- and code- law countries. 
For example, Thailand has a common law origin, but it has low enforcement 
(LAW_ENF=0.48). On the other hand, Sweden has a code-law origin but it has high 
enforcement (LAW_ENF=10). 
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DEV index as reported in Table 1 of Hail and Leuz [2006]. Specifically, a 
country is considered as developing if its equity market is not included in the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International database. Based on this definition, 12 
countries are considered as developing, namely: Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. We re-estimate our models using observations drawn only from 
these developing economies. The results are reported in Table 7.  
 The first two models report the regression results for the full sample, 
using dependent variables SPEC and SPEC1, while the last two models report 
the regression results for the same dependent and explanatory variables, using 
a sample that includes only clients in developing countries. Although sample 
size decreases dramatically in models 3 and 4 (7,511 observations versus 
39,053), the results for firms in developing countries are remarkably similar to 
those in models 1 and 2. This shows that the characteristics of clients that 
choose industry specialists from among the Big N auditors do not vary 
systematically between developed and developing countries. In untabulated 
results, we include the nine country-level variables in the models that are 
estimated using only clients from developing countries. Our results indicate 
that the coefficient estimates for LSALE, LEV, MB, and CAPINT continue to 
be significant. For the country-level variables, only VOTING, SMDEV, and 
LEGAL are positive and significant.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
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In this study, we investigate client choice of industry specialist 
auditors, from among the Big N, in an international (non-U.S.) setting. We 
investigate client-, industry-, and country-level factors hypothesized to 
enhance or decrease client demand for audits by auditors having industry 
expertise. We measure auditors’ industry expertise based on industry market 
shares in clients’ home countries. Using data for 29 countries and 14 
industries from 1993-2005, we find strong evidence that international client 
choice of Big N industry specialist auditors is positively associated with 
client size, client growth opportunities, and client capital intensity. At the 
country level, the choice of industry specialists among Big N auditors is 
strongly associated with legal environment, quality of financial reporting, and 
with national economic development. Our results also suggest, less strongly, 
that choice of industry specialists from among the Big N auditors is higher in 
regulated industries. Our results are generally robust to several sensitivity 
tests. 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of Sample Firms by Country, Year, and Industry 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by country 
Country 
No. of 
firm-years 
 
Percent of 
Firms  represented 
in the sample 
Percent of firms 
audited by Big N 
 
Australia 2,097 5.37 78.61 
Austria 149 0.38 47.70 
Belgium 232 0.59 62.50 
Brazil 641 1.64 82.98 
Canada 3,970 10.17 91.41 
Chile 253 0.65 87.68 
Denmark 773 1.98 83.30 
Finland 529 1.35 72.55 
France 2,059 5.27 42.38 
Germany 2,667 6.83 46.54 
Greece 70 0.18 36.30 
Hong Kong 593 1.52 87.71 
India 136 0.35 8.96 
Indonesia 182 0.47 45.65 
Israel 81 0.21 56.09 
Italy 979 2.51 91.81 
Malaysia 3,341 8.56 65.27 
Mexico 228 0.58 75.25 
Netherland 1,296 3.32 91.21 
Norway 659 1.69 92.24 
Philippines 112 0.29 23.78 
Singapore 2,405 6.16 86.02 
South Africa 388 0.99 87.62 
Spain 586 1.50 90.94 
Sweden 1,682 4.31 80.63 
Switzerland 1,107 2.83 77.30 
Taiwan 1,234 3.16 77.30 
Thailand 845 2.16 39.25 
United kingdom 9,759 24.99 80.30 
Total 39,053 100.00  
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
Year 
No. of 
Firm-years 
Percent of firm-years 
represented in sample 
1993 1,340 3.43 
1994 1,565 4.01 
1995 2,045 5.24 
1996 2,446 6.26 
1997 3,227 8.26 
1998 3,820 9.78 
1999 4,041 10.35 
2000 3,943 10.10 
2001 3,782 9.68 
2002 3,694 9.46 
2003 3,597 9.21 
2004 3,620 9.27 
2005 1,933 4.95 
 39,053 100.00 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by industry 
Industry 
No. of 
Firm-years 
Percent of firm-years 
represented in sample 
Agriculture 321 0.82 
Chemicals 929 2.38 
Computers 3,894 9.97 
Durable manufacturers 11,230 28.76 
Extractives 1,170 3.00 
Financial institutions 594 1.52 
Food 2,102 5.38 
Mining & construction 2,756 7.06 
Pharmaceuticals 540 1.38 
Retail 4,658 11.93 
Services 3,513 9.00 
Textile & printing/publishing 3,734 9.56 
Transportation 2,718 6.96 
Utilities 894 2.29 
Total 39,053 100.00 
 
The sample consists of 39,053 client firm-years for 29 countries over the period 1993-
2005. The sample only includes clients audited by the Big N. Panels A and B show the 
distribution of observations by country and year respectively. Panel C shows the 
distribution of observations by industry. Following Frankel et al. (2002), industry 
membership is determined by the SIC code as follows: agriculture (0100–0999), mining 
& construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles & 
printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals 
(2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 1300–1399), financial institutions (6000–6999), 
durable manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), 
transportation (4000–4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services (7000–
8999, excluding 7370–7379), computers (3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
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TABLE 2 
Means for Firm- and Industry Level Explanatory Variables and Country-Level Index Values 
Panel A: Mean firm- and industry level variables 
Country SPEC SALE LEV MB CAPINT ISSUE LOSS HINDEX REGIND 
Australia 0.40 1,233 0.15 2.27 1.63 0.31 0.22 0.20 0.02 
Austria 0.53 2,796 0.10 1.08 1.74 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.00 
Belgium 0.32 12,582 0.13 5.41 0.73 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.00 
Brazil 0.67 4,421 0.16 4.19 1.93 0.31 0.25 0.10 0.15 
Canada 0.45 1,383 0.17 2.33 2.81 0.41 0.27 0.15 0.07 
Chile 0.62 77,143 0.13 9.20 1.85 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.23 
Denmark 0.59 4,609 0.16 2.12 0.79 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.02 
Finland 0.54 4,173 0.15 2.12 0.55 0.29 0.20 0.23 0.00 
France 0.26 9,520 0.14 2.44 0.65 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.03 
Germany 0.46 5,421 0.09 2.18 0.87 0.25 0.28 0.15 0.04 
Greece 0.44 41,559 0.14 3.06 0.80 0.43 0.06 0.15 0.00 
Hong Kong 0.46 4,408 0.09 1.50 1.43 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.14 
India 0.01 15,064 0.13 4.78 0.60 0.39 0.03 0.10 0.04 
Indonesia 0.36 95,713 0.07 9.32 1.54 0.37 0.41 0.24 0.08 
Israel 0.16 308 0.06 3.86 0.53 0.42 0.42 0.35 0.00 
Italy 0.41 13,993 0.13 8.73 1.16 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.09 
Malaysia 0.30 572 0.08 1.64 1.59 0.24 0.26 0.09 0.02 
Mexico 0.45 20,370 0.20 4.27 1.40 0.41 0.16 0.21 0.14 
Netherland 0.45 3,135 0.13 3.75 0.58 0.30 0.17 0.25 0.03 
Norway 0.49 4,913 0.19 2.70 1.68 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.04 
Philippines 0.46 6,302 0.13 1.45 8.13 0.23 0.41 0.28 0.01 
Singapore 0.41 405 0.09 1.70 1.20 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.03 
South Africa 0.54 6,488 0.07 2.14 0.85 0.45 0.12 0.15 0.00 
Spain 0.66 28,100 0.12 2.91 1.37 0.34 0.07 0.19 0.06 
Sweden 0.41 13,001 0.12 2.29 0.98 0.36 0.32 0.19 0.03 
Switzerland 0.42 2,604 0.16 2.27 1.12 0.25 0.14 0.21 0.11 
Taiwan 0.36 25,887 0.12 1.77 1.06 0.33 0.20 0.08 0.01 
Thailand 0.31 6,466 0.11 1.67 1.66 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.02 
United Kingdom 0.45 1,477 0.12 3.20 1.06 0.29 0.21 0.10 0.04 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Country level variables 
Country LAW_ENF VOTING LEGAL DISC FIN_TAX ACCTG GDP SMDEV ECON 
Australia 9.51 4 1.03 80 1 0.05 20,222 1.04 0.66 
Austria 9.36 2 0.00 62 - - 21,073 0.14 -0.26 
Belgium 9.44 0 -0.94 68 0 -0.24 21,479 0.86 0.51 
Brazil 6.13 3 -0.60 56 1 2.19 3,389 0.29 -1.15 
Canada 9.75 5 1.60 75 1 0.50 18,473 0.51 0.06
Chile 6.52 5 0.50 78 - - 4,822 0.92 -0.28 
Denmark 10 2 0.22 75 1 0.50 28,272 0.56 0.35
Finland 10 3 0.71 83 0 -1.58 18,650 0.32 -0.15 
France 8.68 3 0.26 78 0 -1.13 20,148 0.45 0.04
Germany 9.05 1 -0.59 67 0 -0.15 21,310 0.36 -0.03 
Greece 6.82 2 -0.86 61 - - 12,420 0.58 -0.11 
Hong Kong 8.91 5 1.31 73 1 0.68 22,107 2.48 2.23 
India 5.58 5 0.18 61 1 1.75 395 0.33 -2.34 
Indonesia 2.9 2 -2.18  - - 736 0.28 -2.03 
Israel 7.72 3 -0.07 74 - - 18,311 0.40 -0.07 
Italy 7.07 1 -1.26 66 0 -0.06 16,303 0.13 -0.42 
Malaysia 7.72 4 0.42 79 - - 3,393 2.82 1.53 
Mexico 5.37 1 -1.83 71 - - 5,531 0.26 -0.91 
Netherland 10 2 0.22 74 1 0.59 21,154 1.13 0.78
Norway 10 4 1.19 75 1 0.50 31,325 0.19 0.02 
Philippines 3.47 3 -1.50 64 - - 952 0.66 -1.48
Singapore 8.93 4 0.83 79 1 0.14 20,842 1.35 1.01 
South Africa 6.45 5 0.48 79 1 0.14 2,876 1.51 0.04
Spain 7.14 4 0.23 72 0 -0.59 14,511 0.84 0.26 
Sweden 10 3 0.71 83 0 -1.58 20,837 0.47 0.08 
Switzerland 10 2 0.22 80 0 -1.31 31,168 1.39 1.28 
Taiwan 7.4 3 -0.17 58 - - 12,662 1.03 0.39 
Thailand 4.89 2 -1.51 66 - - 2,134 0.67 -1.01 
United Kingdom 9.22 5 1.42 85 1 -0.40 21,609 1.33 1.01 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Definitions of variables: 
 SPEC = 1 if client j purchases audits from the auditor having at least 20%/24%/30% market share (for the period prior to 1998, 1998-2001, and after 
2001 respectively) in industry k in the national market, and 0 otherwise; 
SALE = sales in millions US$; 
LEV = long-term debt to assets ratio; 
MB = Market-to-book ratio;
CAPINT = gross property plant and equipment divided by sales. 
ISSUE = 1 if the annual change in equity is greater than 15% and 0 otherwise; 
LOSS = 1 if net income is negative and 0 otherwise;
HINDEX = ∑ =nj js1 2 where Sj is market share of firm j based on sales in industry k; 
REGIND = 1 if client j is in operating in regulated industry. Following Francis et al. (1999), regulated industries are defined as the following SIC codes: 
railroad (4011 and 4100), trucking (4210 and 4213), airlines (4512, 4513, 4522, and 4581), telephone communications (4812 and 4813), 
electric companies (4911), gas companies (492, 4923, and 4924), personal credit (6141), and insurance (6311); 
LAW_ENF = mean score of three legal enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. (1998), and used in Leuz et al. (2003). The three variables are (1) 
the mean for 1980-1983 of a variable provided by Business International Corp., capturing the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system; 
(2) the mean for 1982-1995 of a rule of law variable obtained from International Country Risk; and (3) the mean for 1982-1995 of a 
corruption variable that assesses the corruption in government, obtained from International Country Risk. The law enforcement index values 
range from zero to ten, with higher scores for greater law enforcement; 
VOTING = Voting rights index which indicates how easy it is for shareholders to exercise their voting rights. This index ranges from 0 to 5, and is 
constructed by La Porta et al. (1998). It aggregates the following components of shareholder rights: (1) the ability to vote by mail, (2) the 
ability to gain control of shares during the shareholders’ meeting, (3) the possibility of cumulative voting for directors, (4) the ease of 
calling an extraordinary shareholders meeting, and (5) the availability of mechanism allowing minority shareholders to make legal claims 
against the directors. This index ranges from zero to five, with higher scores indicating greater protection of shareholders; 
LEGAL = principal component extracted from LAW_ENF, and VOTING via factor analysis; 
DISC = disclosure level from Saudagaran and Diga (1997, Table 2). The original source is the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR 1995). The higher the number, the higher is the quality of disclosure; 
FIN_TAX = an indicator variable. It equals 1 if tax accounting and financial reporting diverge and 0 otherwise. This index is constructed by and Hung 
(2000); 
ACCTG = principal component extracted from DISC, and FIN_TAX via factor analysis; 
GDP = mean real GDP Per Capita (in US$ of year 2000 buying power), over the period 1993-2005. LGDP is the natural logarithm of GDP;  
SMDEV = mean values of stock market development measured by stock market capitalization divided by GDP, over the period 1993-2005. 
ECON = principal component extracted from LGDP, and SMDEV via factor analysis. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrices 
 
 SPEC LSALE LEV MB CAPINT ISSUE LOSS HINDEX REGIND LAW_ENF VOTING LEGAL DISC FIN_TAX ACCTG LGDP SMDEV ECON 
SPEC 1.00                  
LSALE 0.16* 1.00                 
LEV 0.07* 0.29* 1.00                
MB 0.00 -0.04* -0.07* 1.00               
CAPINT 0.01* -0.03* 0.26* -0.16* 1.00              
ISSUE -0.01 0.00 -0.02* 0.18* -0.10* 1.00             
LOSS -0.04* -0.25* -0.05* -0.10* 0.05* -0.16* 1.00            
HINDEX 0.03* 0.13* 0.08* 0.01 0.12* 0.01 0.01 1.00           
REGIND 0.05* 0.12* 0.12* 0.01 0.17* -0.01 -0.02* 0.17* 1.00          
LAW_ENF 0.05* -0.12* 0.13* 0.09* -0.11* 0.04* 0.01 0.15* -0.01 1.00         
VOTING 0.02* -0.27* 0.00 0.09* 0.01 0.04* 0.00 -0.32* 0.01 0.16* 1.00        
LEGAL 0.03* -0.32* 0.05* 0.10* -0.02* 0.05* 0.02* -0.22* 0.00 0.47* 0.92* 1.00       
DISC 0.00 -0.32* -0.02* 0.08* -0.15* -0.01 -0.01 -0.29* -0.04* 0.34* 0.62* 0.63 1.00      
FIN_TAX 0.04* -0.25* 0.01 0.06* 0.05* 0.03* -0.01 -0.21* -0.01 0.16* 0.73* 0.68 0.36* 1.00     
ACCTG 0.04* -0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.17* 0.03* 0.02* 0.19* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.07* 0.58* 0.54* 1.00    
LGDP 0.03* -0.12* 0.06* 0.06* -0.19* 0.00 0.05* 0.10* 0.01 0.65* 0.09* 0.29 0.39* -0.06* -0.30 1.00   
SMDEV -0.02* -0.26* -0.08* 0.03* -0.07* 0.00 0.00 -0.25* -0.01 0.05* 0.45* 0.37 0.60* 0.36* -0.24 0.23* 1.00  
ECON -0.03* -0.30* -0.09* 0.00 -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.29* -0.02* 0.05* 0.43* 0.35* 0.59* 0.48* -0.15* 0.13* 0.81* 1.00 
 
Notes: 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. LSALE is the natural logarithm of SALE. LGDP is the natural logarithm of GDP. The full sample for the correlation 
coefficients is 39,053 client firm-years for 29 countries over the period 1993-2005. 
 
* Significance level of 0.01 (two-tailed). 
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TABLE 4 
Logistic Regression Results Explaining Choice of Big N Industry Audit Specialists: 
Dependent variable: SPEC 
 Exp. Sign 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Intercept   
-2.666 
(117.17)*** 
-1.766 
(151.72)*** 
-1.655 
(283.46)*** 
-2.785 
(45.23)*** 
-1.713 
(203.47)*** 
-1.230 
(162.62)*** 
-3.444 
(80.05)*** 
-1.434 
(150.48)*** 
-1.447 
(209.09)*** 
-1.524 
(242.84)*** 
LSALE 
 
+ 0.171 
(153.38)*** 
0.164 
(172.69)*** 
0.181 
(214.72)*** 
0.171 
(230.68)*** 
0.195 
(243.40)*** 
0.171 
(157.87)*** 
0.160 
(138.19)*** 
0.151 
(129.63)*** 
0.158 
(144.11)*** 
0.193 
(251.58)*** 
LEV 
 
+ 0.156 
(1.61) 
0.274 
(5.35)** 
0.132 
(1.17) 
0.271 
(6.08)*** 
-0.015 
(0.01) 
0.104 
(0.57) 
0.213 
(3.39)* 
0.391 
(11.36)*** 
0.385 
(11.24)*** 
0.036 
(0.06) 
MB 
 
+ 0.005 
(27.64)*** 
0.004 
(18.12)*** 
0.005 
(26.36)*** 
0.005 
(26.32)*** 
0.003 
(10.39)*** 
0.003 
(10.39)*** 
0.005 
(22.23)*** 
0.004 
(16.97)*** 
0.005 
(22.20)*** 
0.003 
(12.94)*** 
CAPINT 
 
+ 0.012 
(17.17)*** 
0.009 
(11.23)*** 
0.011 
(14.38)*** 
0.011 
(17.50)*** 
0.013 
(15.82)*** 
0.011 
(13.75)*** 
0.012 
(16.44)*** 
0.010 
(12.38)*** 
0.010 
(14.03)*** 
0.012 
(16.38)*** 
ISSUE 
 
+ -0.038 
(1.71) 
-0.044 
(2.41) 
-0.049 
(2.97)* 
-0.031 
(1.11) 
-0.068 
(5.22)** 
-0.065 
(4.59)** 
-0.035 
(1.42) 
-0.034 
(1.32) 
-0.025 
(0.72) 
-0.062 
(4.47)** 
LOSS 
 
? 0.032 
(0.70) 
0.029 
(0.61) 
0.046 
(1.61) 
0.047 
(1.75) 
0.123 
(10.20)*** 
0.089 
(4.94)** 
0.020 
(0.28) 
0.015 
(0.16) 
0.026 
(0.46) 
0.120 
(9.68)*** 
HINDEX 
 
- -0.091 
(0.25) 
0.221 
(1.37) 
0.197 
(1.16) 
0.112 
(0.37) 
-0.163 
(0.77) 
-0.345 
(3.51)* 
-0.122 
(0.43) 
0.054 
(0.08) 
0.101 
(0.29) 
-0.225 
(1.48) 
REGIND 
 
+ 0.218 
(9.99)*** 
0.179 
(6.86)*** 
0.178 
(6.55)*** 
0.201 
(8.46)*** 
0.116 
(2.57)* 
0.118 
(2.81)* 
0.213 
(9.62)*** 
0.194 
(7.96)*** 
0.194 
(8.11)*** 
0.091 
(1.64) 
LAW_ENF 
 
+ 0.142 
(35.37)*** 
         
VOTING 
 
+  0.095 
(13.56)*** 
        
LEGAL 
 
+   0.230 
(39.60)*** 
      0.079 
(2.79)* 
DISC 
 
+    0.017 
(11.29)*** 
      
FIN_TAX 
 
+     0.404 
(22.24)*** 
     
ACCTG 
 
+      0.175 
(11.38)*** 
   0.204 
(15.50)*** 
LGDP 
 
+       0.216 
(31.71)*** 
   
SMDEV 
 
+        0.091 
(2.67)* 
  
ECON 
 
+         0.113 
(5.44)** 
0.164 
(6.32)*** 
χ2 stat  355.86*** 355.73*** 444.40*** 436.33*** 496.26*** 338.91*** 330.73*** 285.28*** 581.16*** 542.55*** 
N  39,053 39,053 39,053 38,871 32,558 32,558 39,053 39,053 32,558 32,558 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Notes: 
 
SPECjk equals ‘one’ if client j, headquartered in nation l purchases audits from the auditor having at least 20%/24%/30% market share (for the period prior to 
1998, 1998-2001, and after 2001 respectively) in industry k in the national market. SPECjk is defined as ‘zero’ otherwise. See Table 2 for other variable 
definitions. LSALE is the natural logarithm of SALE. LGDP is the natural logarithm of GDP. 
 
We report the Wald statistic in the parenthesis. */**/*** Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 (two-tailed) respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Logistic Regression Results Explaining Choice of Big N Industry Audit Specialists: 
Dependent variable: SPEC1 
 Exp. Sign 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Intercept  -3.011 (141.90)*** 
-2.230 
(225.30)*** 
-2.167 
(370.46)*** 
-2.681 
(59.25)*** 
-2.244 
(267.90)*** 
-1.838 
(282.85)*** 
-3.853 
(80.79)*** 
-2.062 
(362.71)*** 
-2.059 
(401.59)*** 
-2.086 
(346.50)*** 
LSALE 
 
+ 0.146 
(134.79)*** 
0.138 
(152.37)*** 
0.152 
(173.70)*** 
0.143 
(157.18)*** 
0.159 
(157.64)*** 
0.139 
(105.51)*** 
0.138 
(137.21)*** 
0.132 
(146.57)*** 
0.139 
(161.74)*** 
0.157 
(163.85)*** 
LEV 
 
+ 0.203 
(2.36) 
0.311 
(6.08)*** 
0.194 
(2.24) 
0.293 
(5.88)*** 
0.049 
(0.12) 
0.149 
(1.05) 
0.239 
(3.82)** 
0.401 
(10.11)*** 
0.392 
(9.89)*** 
0.097 
(0.43) 
MB 
 
+ 0.004 
(25.22)*** 
0.003 
(15.58)*** 
0.004 
(22.77)*** 
0.004 
(20.53)*** 
0.003 
(9.74)*** 
0.001 
(2.85)* 
0.004 
(21.25)*** 
0.003 
(16.30)*** 
0.004 
(20.90)*** 
0.003 
(8.49)*** 
CAPINT 
 
+ 0.010 
(14.95)*** 
0.008 
(9.30)*** 
0.009 
(11.77)*** 
0.009 
(12.68)*** 
0.009 
(11.16)*** 
0.008 
(8.62)*** 
0.010 
(14.91)*** 
0.008 
(10.85)*** 
0.009 
(12.19)*** 
0.009 
(10.59)*** 
ISSUE 
 
+ -0.017 
(0.39) 
-0.022 
(0.66) 
-0.025 
(0.85) 
-0.009 
(0.10) 
-0.024 
(0.65) 
-0.023 
(0.55) 
-0.015 
(0.28) 
-0.015 
(0.30) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.019 
(0.39) 
LOSS 
 
? 0.057 
(2.15) 
0.052 
(1.75) 
0.066 
(2.99)* 
0.069 
(3.36)* 
0.139 
(12.74)*** 
0.112 
(7.57)*** 
0.049 
(1.49) 
0.046 
(1.37) 
0.056 
(2.06) 
0.450 
(5.72)** 
HINDEX 
 
- 0.429 
(5.93)** 
0.654 
(13.49)*** 
0.642 
(13.57)*** 
0.573 
(10.95)*** 
0.504 
(7.27)*** 
0.369 
(3.86)** 
0.396 
(4.95)** 
0.554 
(10.31)*** 
0.598 
(11.85)*** 
0.450369 
(5.72)** 
REGIND 
 
+ 0.142 
(4.91)** 
0.114 
(3.23)* 
0.111 
(2.99)* 
0.134 
(4.49)** 
0.073 
(1.13) 
0.073 
(1.12) 
0.140 
(4.75)** 
0.117 
(3.55)* 
0.119 
(3.56)* 
0.048 
(0.51) 
LAW_ENF 
 
+ 0.116 
(23.72)*** 
         
VOTING 
 
+  0.069 
(8.06)*** 
        
LEGAL 
 
+   0.178 
(22.99)*** 
      0.062 
(2.94)* 
DISC 
 
+    0.009 
(4.32)** 
      
FIN_TAX 
 
+     0.339 
(15.54)*** 
     
ACCTG 
 
+      0.150 
(10.06)*** 
   0.179 
(12.59)*** 
LGDP 
 
+       0.197 
(21.43)*** 
   
SMDEV 
 
+        0.111 
(5.14)** 
  
ECON 
 
+         0.124 
(8.08)*** 
0.145 
(6.97)*** 
χ2 stat  236.47*** 242.92*** 266.91*** 237.30*** 291.74*** 234.98*** 237.17*** 242.52*** 268.75*** 329.61*** 
N  39,053 39,053 39,053 38,871 32,558 32,558 39,053 39,053 39,053 32,558 
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Notes: 
 
SPEC1jk equals ‘one’ if client j, headquartered in nation l, purchases audits from the auditor having the largest value of ADTR_MS in industry k in nation l. 
SPEC1jk is defined as ‘zero’ otherwise. See Table 2 for definitions of other variables. LSALE is the natural logarithm of SALE. LGDP is the natural 
logarithm of GDP. 
 
We report the Wald statistic in the parenthesis. */**/*** Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 (two-tailed) respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Logistic Regression Results Explaining Choice of Big N Industry Audit Specialists: 
Dependent variable: SPEC (Removing clients cross-listed in the U.S.) 
 Exp. Sign 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Intercept  -2.538 (95.91)*** 
-1.651 
(122.74)*** 
-1.543 
(216.55)*** 
-2.611 
(39.42)*** 
-1.596 
(166.99)*** 
-1.079 
(119.28)*** 
-3.301 
(70.47)*** 
-1.297 
(116.03)*** 
-1.307 
(161.52)*** 
-1.376 
(184.27)*** 
LSALE 
 
+ 0.156 
(115.34)*** 
0.147 
(125.43)*** 
0.166 
(160.35)*** 
0.156 
(170.08)*** 
0.178 
(181.08)*** 
0.152 
(113.64)*** 
0.145 
(100.49)*** 
0.134 
(93.18)*** 
0.140 
(103.99)*** 
0.173 
(180.56)*** 
LEV 
 
+ 0.149 
(1.39) 
0.272 
(4.94)** 
0.121 
(0.91) 
0.278 
(6.13)*** 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.116 
(0.67) 
0.212 
(3.22)* 
0.394 
(11.10)*** 
0.389 
(11.06)*** 
0.057 
(0.15) 
MB 
 
+ 0.005 
(19.71)*** 
0.004 
(13.00)*** 
0.005 
(19.23)*** 
0.005 
(19.25)*** 
0.003 
(6.55)*** 
0.001 
(1.59) 
0.005 
(15.90)*** 
0.004 
(11.86)*** 
0.004 
(15.50)*** 
0.003 
(7.30)*** 
CAPINT 
 
+ 0.011 
(14.36)*** 
0.008 
(8.65)*** 
0.009 
(11.71)*** 
0.010 
(14.33)*** 
0.011 
(13.03)*** 
0.010 
(10.51)*** 
0.011 
(13.64)*** 
0.008 
(9.57)*** 
0.009 
(10.83)*** 
0.011 
(13.13)*** 
ISSUE 
 
+ -0.045 
(2.24) 
-0.051 
(2.98)* 
-0.056 
(3.79)** 
-0.037 
(1.47) 
-0.071 
(5.34)** 
-0.068 
(4.70)** 
-0.040 
(1.83) 
-0.039 
(1.62) 
-0.030 
(1.05) 
-0.065 
(4.53)** 
LOSS 
 
? 0.010 
(0.07) 
0.008 
(0.04) 
0.025 
(0.49) 
0.026 
(0.53) 
0.104 
(7.51)*** 
0.067 
(2.82)* 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.099 
(6.73)*** 
HINDEX 
 
- -0.273 
(2.20) 
0.044 
(0.05) 
0.025 
(0.02) 
-0.066 
(0.12) 
-0.359 
(3.90)** 
-0.575 
(10.12)*** 
-0.308 
(2.73)* 
-0.137 
(0.51) 
-0.088 
(0.22) 
-0.439 
(5.94)** 
REGIND 
 
+ 0.165 
(5.19)** 
0.129 
(3.28)* 
0.129 
(3.09)* 
0.155 
(4.60)** 
0.065 
(0.72) 
0.058 
(0.61) 
0.165 
(5.17)** 
0.146 
(4.13)** 
0.146 
(4.20)** 
0.038 
(0.26) 
LAW_ENF 
 
+ 0.141 
(32.31)*** 
         
VOTING 
 
+  0.097 
(13.61)*** 
        
LEGAL 
 
+   0.234 
(38.16)*** 
      0.073 
(3.36)* 
DISC 
 
+    0.017 
(10.49)*** 
      
FIN_TAX 
 
+     0.418 
(23.44)*** 
     
ACCTG 
 
+      0.196 
(14.13)*** 
   0.222 
(18.04)*** 
LGDP 
 
+       0.214 
(30.45)*** 
   
SMDEV 
 
+        0.083 
(2.20) 
  
ECON 
 
+         0.100 
(4.19)** 
0.167 
(6.45)*** 
χ2 stat  258.29*** 249.07*** 313.99*** 309.45*** 362.25*** 255.89*** 227.52*** 199.77*** 227.94*** 385.42*** 
N  36,934 36,934 36,934 36,752 30,604 30,604 36,934 36,934 36,934 30,604 
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Notes: 
 
We delete 2,119 client firm-years, relating to those clients that cross-list their shares in the U.S. market, since the firms’ auditor choice may be related to their 
overseas equity issues. See Table 2 for definitions of the variables. LSALE is the natural logarithm of SALE. LGDP is the natural logarithm of GDP. 
 
We report the Wald statistic in the parenthesis. */**/*** Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 (two-tailed) respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Logistic Regression Results Explaining Choice of Big N Industry Audit Specialists: 
Full Sample versus Developing Countries 
 
  Full Sample Developing Countries 
 
Exp. Sign Model 
1 
DV=SPEC 
Model 
2 
DV=SPEC1 
Model 
3 
DV=SPEC 
Model 
4 
DV=SPEC1 
Intercept  -1.289 (149.18)*** 
-1.886 
(303.87)*** 
-1.876 
(12.05)*** 
-2.339 
(69.20)*** 
LSALE 
 
+ 0.146 
(109.15)*** 
0.126 
(107.67)*** 
0.155 
(36.21)*** 
0.155 
(35.41)*** 
LEV 
 
+ 0.380 
(10.80)*** 
0.388 
(9.41)*** 
0.630 
(6.07)*** 
0.896 
(9.36)*** 
MB 
 
+ 0.004 
(14.27)*** 
0.003 
(12.74)*** 
0.007 
(45.35)*** 
0.004 
(20.65)*** 
 
     
CAPINT 
 
+ 0.009 
(11.61)*** 
0.008 
(9.60)*** 
0.013 
(3.75)** 
0.017 
(6.15)*** 
ISSUE 
 
+ -0.034 
(1.33) 
-0.015 
(0.30) 
0.066 
(1.50) 
-0.031 
(0.29) 
LOSS 
 
? 0.008 
(0.04) 
0.037 
(0.85) 
-0.207 
(5.88)** 
-0.237 
(5.11)** 
HINDEX 
 
- 0.020 
(0.01) 
0.519 
(8.53)*** 
0.872 
(1.65) 
0.389 
(0.50) 
REGIND 
 
+ 0.209 
(9.58)*** 
0.136 
(4.61)** 
0.556 
(6.56)*** 
0.494 
(8.54)*** 
      
χ2 stat  256.41*** 236.46*** 163.58*** 113.53*** 
N  39,053 39,053 7,511 7,511 
 
Notes: 
 
See Tables 2 and 5 for variable definitions. In models 3 and 4 the sample only includes firms in the developing countries. Countries are considered as 
developing if the country’s equity market is not included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International database (Hail and Leuz [2006] Table 1). Based on this 
definition, 12 countries are included in models 3 and 4, namely, Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Models 1 and 2 provide results using the full sample.  
 
We report the Wald statistic in the parenthesis. */**/*** Significance level of 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 (two-tailed) respectively. 
 
